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Abstract
The European Union is becoming a regulatory state with many faces. Classical top-down 
regulatory policy is joined by less authoritative, less interventionist and more participatory 
regulatory forms. At least in part, these regulatory experiments are intended to improve the quality 
of governing in the EU – both from an output (decision making, implementation, problem solving) 
and input (democratic quality) perspective. This paper has two aims: To arrive at a differentiated 
picture of the EU regulatory state, we develop a typology of different modes of EU regulation 
ranging from classical legal instruments to softer forms of steering the economy and society. In a 
second step we are looking at the regulatory transition from a normative angle and analyse the 
various types of regulation employed in EU policy making on the basis of several evaluation 
criteria, offering a critical commentary on regulatory modes and trends. 
Kurzfassung
Die Europäische Union entwickelt sich zu einem “Regulierungsstaat” mit vielen Gesichtern. 
Weniger autoritative, weniger interventionistische und partizipatorischere Formen der regulativen 
Steuerung beginnen hierarchische, ordnungsrechtliche Regulierungsansätze zu ergänzen. Eine 
Motivation für diese regulierungspolitischen Experimente ist der Wunsch das Regieren auf EU-
Ebene sowohl von der Output- (Entscheidungsfindung, Implementation, Problembewältigung) als 
auch von der Inputseite (demokratische Qualität) zu verbessern. Dieses Papier verfolgt daher zwei 
Ziele: Um die Ausdifferenzierung des EU Regulierungsstaates in das Blickfeld zu bekommen, 
entwickeln wir eine Typologie der verschiedenen zu beobachtenden Regulierungsmodi. In einem 
zweiten Schritt nehmen wir eine normative Perspektive ein und analysieren sowie kommentieren 
diese Regulierungsmodi und -trends auf der Grundlage verschiedener Evaluierungskriterien. 
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1 Introduction   
Forms of governance are in transition on an international scale. Neither the juxtaposition of the 
market and state regulation nor that of public versus private actors in governing society match well 
with the multiple faces of modern governance. The classical regulatory state which has emerged as 
an alternative to the welfare state – both however with the intent to complement or correct market 
mechanisms – is gradually changing its distinctive face of top-down authoritative control of market 
and society and joining with other steering mechanisms(1). The process of regulating is being 
decentralised, allowing access to and spreading responsibilities across economic and societal actors; 
the regulations itself are taking on various forms ranging from substantive rules, incentives to 
procedural requirements; chains of control are blurring and mechanisms of control softening with the 
emphasis shifting towards more responsiveness and self-responsibility.  
While this trend is a general one, the European Union (EU), which has been characterised as a 
regulatory state par excellence (Majone 1994), represents a particularly good example to investigate 
and evaluate it. As part of a larger governance debate in Europe, triggered by a declining 
competitiveness of the European economy globally, concerns with regard to the protection of 
citizens in an increasingly uncertain environment (characterised by rapid technological change as 
well as open borders, and the fading capacities of national states to cope with these challenges), the 
EU is experimenting with a variety of different regulatory approaches. Historically, the EU 
regulators were caught between functional needs and political pressures and hence, the EU 
regulatory apparatus developed ad hoc and in patchwork style. Nevertheless, we can observe the 
emergence of less authoritative, less interventionist, more participatory regulatory forms.  
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engage in this development. Of particular importance in this respect is its nature as a multi-level 
system. The complex intermeshing of powers and competencies of public and private actors at 
varying institutional levels poses enormous challenges with respect to the accommodation of diverse 
interests in order to ensure the system's overall legitimacy, both in terms of input (democratic 
standards) and output criteria (decision-making, implementation, problem-solving). As a 
consequence, we observe a complex picture of coexisting and overlapping patterns of regulation both 
within and across different policy sectors.  
Based on this observation, this chapter has two objectives. First, it is our aim to structure the 
complex picture of different modes of EU regulation. To arrive at a differentiated picture of the EU 
regulatory state, we develop a typology of different modes of European regulation ranging from 
classical legal instruments to softer forms of steering the economy and society (akin to Scott’s 
concept of the (post-) regulatory state; in Scott 2003). In a second step, we are looking at the 
regulatory transition from a normative angle. Although the choice of regulatory instruments will 
always be the result of political processes shaped by interests, power as well as institutional 
constellations, the functionality of regulatory instruments in terms of policy outcome and societal 
impact is likely to enter the debate. This is true especially in the EU which continues to suffer from 
unstable support in the population as well as parts of the political elite. Hence, we analyse the 
various types of regulation employed in EU policy making on the basis of several evaluation criteria, 
offering a critical commentary on regulatory modes and trends.  
2
2 European Governance: A Typology of Regulatory Modes   
In order to classify the varying patterns of regulation characterising European governance, we 
proceed in two steps. First, we look at different forms of intervention which emerge from the specific 
allocation of competencies within the multi-level system. In a second step, we attempt to develop 
this typology further by analysing the process set in motion through these forms of intervention; i.e., 
the steering mechanisms by which the intended policy objectives shall be achieved.  
2.1 Forms of Intervention   
Considering that we are dealing with the EU, we need to pay particular attention to the multi-level 
structure framing regulatory processes. This institutional context forces us to consider the 
distribution of responsibilities across regulatory centres (such as the EU, national executives or non-
state actors). We therefore focus on two dimensions of regulatory intervention: the level of 
obligation and the level of discretion. EU regulatory policy may differ in terms of its obligatory 
nature imposed on its addressees, hence the level of legal authority associated with EU intervention. 
In addition, EU regulatory policy may differ with respect to the distribution of tasks across the levels 
of governance and the level of discretion they grant to decentralised actors in the implementation 
process. While both dimensions may apply to regulatory approaches in general, they are particularly 
central in the evolution of the EU regulatory state.  
The following table summarises the mix of regulatory patterns that currently co-exists in the EU. 
Combining the two dimensions of regulation – obligation and discretion – we arrive at four modes of 
intervention. In the table we identify those classes of regulatory instruments that are representative 
for each mode(2).  
Table 1
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true enough, these regulatory instruments remain the dominant form of intervention in the European 
single market and other spheres of social life (cf. Héritier 2002; Holzinger, Knill and Schäfer 2003). 
Regulatory standards usually entail obligatory and detailed rules, allowing the EU Commission – at 
least in theory – to control the level of compliance on the national and regional level (Baldwin and 
Cave 1999, 160). Concentrating on both standard setting and legal control at the supranational level, 
this is the most hierarchical (top-down) mode of regulation.  
The so-called new instruments are a mixed bag of regulatory tools(3). What they have in common is 
a more indirect approach towards achieving behavioural change. While the level of obligation for the 
national administration is high, the addressees of these policy instruments have broad leeway to 
comply within a relatively open regulatory space (framework regulation) or to react to new 
procedural or incentive structures (economic and communicative instruments).  
Framework regulations leave it to decentralised levels of governance to add regulatory substance 
fitting local conditions into the European framework defining obligatory general guidelines and 
goals (Baldwin and Cave 1999, 161). Economic and communicative instruments have been designed 
to target the problem perception and incentive structures of economic and social actors. Instead of 
hierarchy, these regulations emphasise participation, self-initiative, and voluntarism. Procedural 
requirements are meant to contribute to achieving substantive objectives (cf. Knill and Lenschow 
2000).  
3
The instruments listed in the second row of the table shift regulatory responsibility away from the 
EU level to private actors or national authorities. The self-regulatory model is based on private actors 
devising concrete regulatory standards - in the shadow of the state. Typically, an industrial 
association (as opposed to government or firm) sets rules and standards (codes of practice) for the 
conduct of the associated firms (Gunningham and Rees 1997, 365). The level of control shifts from 
EU to the industry-level, although the failure to self-regulate may trigger the return to the regulatory 
standards approach.  
In the EU, private self-regulation can be observed in two basic forms. First, self-regulation is based 
on voluntary agreements between the Commission and sectoral associations. In these agreements 
(which officially are declared as Commission recommendations), industry commits itself to the 
implementation of certain requirements. A second pattern can be observed in the field of social 
policy. Based on the Social Protocol of the Maastricht Treaty the Commission is not only legally 
required to consult the European peak associations of industry and trade unions before developing 
social policy proposals. The member states have also accepted that negotiations between these 
associations can serve as a substitute for traditional European regulatory processes (Falkner 2000). 
The final agreement of the corporatist partners, however, takes the traditional form of an EU 
directive.  
While all types discussed to far have to do with rules to be followed, the OMC follows a mere 
process model. While certain policy benchmarks are set for the Union, national responses are 
formulated independently and without the threat of formal sanctions. The EU merely provides a 
context and enabling structures for cooperation and learning among national policy makers. The 
regulatory impact of this approach rests on dissemination of best practice and the provision of 
incentives (peer review) rather than legal obligation and control. Hence, the level of obligation to a 
regulatory centre is low and a wide range of policy strategies to achieve general EU targets could be 
chosen.  
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Each regulatory type implies a different mechanism of policy adaptation on the national level and 
hence, also a different model of governance in the European multi-level system. We can distinguish 
three general mechanisms through which regulators might seek to affect the behaviour of the 
regulated: (a) they may be coerced to comply with the regulation, (b) they may be "tempted" to 
change their behaviour due to incentive effects of the regulation and (c) they may learn, i.e. redefine 
their interests on the basis of new knowledge gathered due to the regulatory context and 
subsequently adapt their behaviour. As most regulatory instruments are characterised by various 
mechanisms, we developed a ranking. In table 2 we distinguish between three levels of relevance 
(++ dominant mechanism; + relevant mechanism; 0 irrelevant mechanism). In assessing the relative 
importance of steering mechanisms, the analytical focus is on the underlying intentions of the 
regulators rather than the actual performance or "objective" relevance of these mechanisms.  
Table 2  
We argue that different types of regulations entail different models of governance. The early 
European regulatory state relied primarily on the hierarchy model with its implied powers of 
coercion. This model makes no attempt to influence the awareness of the addressees of the problem 
structure by either tackling strategic or cognitive foundations of individual behaviour.  
The new modes depart from the hierarchical model to different degrees. The least radical departure 
leads to the application of new instruments. This public delegation model relies on an authoritative 
framework, but places particular emphasis on creating incentive structures at the EU level and 
leaving discretionary space for lower levels of governance to add the relevant administrative 
procedures. The widespread inability or unwillingness of lower level administrative agents to 
implement detailed EU regulation has been one reason for experimenting with such softer 
instruments.  
4
A more far-reaching departure from the hierarchical model of regulation is the delegation model 
based on private self-regulation (Black 1996; Ogus 1995). The EU calls especially on economic 
actors to form a private network in order to solve particular problems collectively. The private 
network is responsible for setting regulatory standards and for ensuring compliance. The dominant 
mechanism leading to behavioural change relies on the provision of incentives as the self-regulatory 
approach induces economic actors to comply with rules formulated "in their name" and in view of 
their needs and capacities. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this model generally exists with a 
"fall-back regulatory option", i.e. in conjunction and in the shadow of the hierarchical state. 
Moreover, learning effects among the members of the private network constitute a supplementary 
steering mechanism.  
Finally, the most fundamental departure from the hierarchy model is the OMC. Here, hierarchy does 
not even feature as a fall-back option. Regulatory responsibility is entirely located at the national 
level (where the hierarchical model may still apply, however), hence the notion of radical 
subsidiarity (cf. Hodson and Maher 2001). The EU assumes a completely new governance function 
in facilitating coordination and mutual learning among national policy elites. There is no formal 
attempt to control outcomes, although the method is dependent on the prior agreement on general 
principles and goals in the policy area in question (de la Porte and Pochet 2002; Scott and Trubek 
2002). Moreover, hierarchical elements in terms of reporting requirements and the reliance on 
incentive structures (peer pressure) are complementary steering mechanisms that stimulate learning 
and diffusion processes.  
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Regulation   
To decide whether a certain mode of regulation reflects "good governance" or not, we need to be 
clear about the benchmarks of such an evaluation (cf. Baldwin 1995; Baldwin and Cave 1999, 76). 
When considering the current political and scientific discussion on "good governance" in the EU, it 
becomes obvious that these criteria are debatable. The main conflict deals with the question whether 
either input or output legitimacy of European regulation should serve as primary evaluation criteria 
(Scharpf 1999).  
Traditionally, output factors constitute the major focus of legitimising EU regulatory policy. 
Particular attention is paid to three factors: (1) the extent to which the EU has the capacity of taking 
political decisions in a certain area; (2) the extent to which these decisions are actually implemented 
and complied with at the national level; and (3) the degree to which the policies in question achieve 
their intended objectives (problem-solving capacity). The concern with these factors can be traced to 
the nature of the EU political system, where high consensus requirements in the decision-making 
process and lacking powers of hierarchical intervention during the implementation stage constitute 
far-reaching problems for efficient and effective governance.  
The intensive concern with decision-making and implementation diverted attention from questions 
of input legitimacy. While this narrow evaluative base did fit the technocratic image of the EU as an 
institution established to deal with problem-solving deficiencies of the nation state, it is inadequate 
once we consider the EU as a new polity or system of governance. With the waning acceptance of 
EU policy-making among the European citizens in recent years, the democratic quality of the EU has 
finally taken up in the academic debate on EU governance (cf. Abromeit 1998; Zürn 1996).  
The recognition of this multiple legitimisation challenge among EU policy makers is visible not only 
in the publication of the White Paper on Governance, but also in the general regulatory practice as 
described above. A general analysis of the merits of different regulatory modes with respect to the 
various normative criteria has not been performed so far. In the following, we will attempt therefore 
such an evaluation(4). Of course, we acknowledge that the actual politics of regulatory choice is only 
partially normatively driven, but the result of multiple interests interacting in a complex institutional 
setting. Nevertheless, the present existential debates within the EU open windows of opportunity for 
normative evaluation to influence future policy making.  
5
There are certain limits to such evaluation: We will not weigh the relative significance of the 
individual performance indicators because in our view such weighing depends on the particular 
policy context as well as individual (or cultural) preferences. Hence, we do not claim to develop a 
final rank order of regulatory approaches in this paper; rather we try to develop a general template 
for assessing the potential of EU policy in light of particular circumstances. Only knowledge of the 
circumstances will enable the regulator to make choices with respect to potential trade-offs between 
two performance criteria. Notwithstanding these problems of evaluation, we think that much can be 
said for trying to assess regulatory performance. We will get an idea to what extent (and at what 
costs) the shift from the hierarchical mode of regulation towards alternative forms of EU intervention 
may actually result in an overall improvement of regulatory performance. Furthermore, we will gain 
some insights on the question to what extent a certain regulatory approach can be significantly 
improved on one of the four criteria without substantive loss on another. In other words, we are able 
to compare the relative strengths and weaknesses of different regulatory approaches with respect to 
their input and output legitimacy.  
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A necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for effective regulation is the capability of governments 
to take a regulatory decision (or to enact a legislative mandate). This capacity can hardly be taken for 
granted, but varies across different political systems, depending on the specific institutional rules 
characterising the decision-making process. With respect to the EU, especially Scharpf (1999) 
emphasised far-reaching structural deficits in this regard, given the high consensus requirements in 
the Council. Although this view is not uncontested in the literature (cf. Benz 1998; Héritier, Knill 
and Mingers 1996), there seems to be a general agreement that decision-making at the European 
level is a demanding process, that, in many instances, requires the use of "subterfuges" (Héritier 
1999) in order to escape from deadlock.  
This general statement needs to be differentiated, however. Scharpf (1997) developed an important 
distinction between product and process standards (see also Holzinger 2001). Moreover, as will be 
argued in the following, the decision-making capacity of the EU multi-level system also varies with 
the underlying mode of regulation.  
More precisely, there exists a close linkage between this capacity and respective levels of discretion 
and obligation implied by different modes of regulation. Quite obviously decision-making capacity 
decreases if the level of regulatory discretion goes down. The challenges to reach a consensus in the 
Council rises the more EU policies are based on very detailed regulatory arrangements, significantly 
constraining the options of national governments and authorities or private actors for adjusting to EU 
requirements. At the same time, the task to achieve an agreement between heterogeneous national 
interests increases with the extent to which regulatory requirements impose legally binding 
obligations on the decision makers.  
Consequently, the ability to reach decisions can be expected to be lowest, if the EU adopts the model 
of hierarchical intervention by regulatory standards. As outlined above, this approach typically 
implies the prescription of rather detailed and legally binding requirements which have to be 
implemented and enforced by the member states. At first glance, this finding is in sharp contrast with 
the high number of regulatory standards which still constitute the dominant form of European 
regulation. This tendency, however, is basically the result of the member states' general consensus 
towards the establishment of a common market which is based on harmonised national rules and 
standards. On the other hand, this "permissive consensus" in favour of harmonisation varies across 
policy areas and problem types. With respect to market-making regulations and product standards 
the adoption of regulatory standards is more likely than in fields of market-shaping regulations 
defining requirements for national production and process standards (Scharpf 1997). Against this 
backdrop, it is hardly surprising that the Commission has increasingly experimented with other 
modes of regulation in order to overcome potential deadlocks in decision-making (Knill and Héritier 
1996).  
6
In sharp contrast with the regulatory standards approach, decision-making is relatively 
unproblematic in the OMC case. Agreement on benchmarks and guidelines between the member 
states is facilitated by the fact that they enjoy broad leeway in achieving these rather general and 
non-obligatory objectives. The relatively frictionless decision-making might explain why this mode 
of regulation is of particular importance in areas where the hierarchical approach of regulatory 
standards turned out to be highly ineffective such as social or home affairs policy (Working Group 
2001).  
The performance of the remaining modes of regulation (new instruments and private self-regulation) 
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of new instruments, a mixed account emerges from the fact that they generally define broad, but 
nevertheless legally binding requirements. While considerable discretion for domestic compliance 
places them close to the OMC, their obligatory nature underlines their proximity to regulatory 
intervention. In the end, the decision-making dynamics depend on the specific mixture of 
hierarchical and non-hierarchical elements in the Commission proposal, which might vary from case 
to case. Thus, in the case of economic and communicative instruments it can often be observed that 
substantive discretion (in terms of goal attainment) coincides with highly detailed procedural rules, 
limiting the member states’ actual implementation choices. Such rules apply typically to consultation 
requirements, reporting obligations, and transparency concerns (Knill and Lenschow 2000; Scott and 
Trubek 2002). In the case of framework regulation, by contrast, non-hierarchical elements seem to 
play a more important role. Although framework directives may be combined with more detailed 
daughter directives, which tend to resemble the classical approach of hierarchical intervention, they 
exemplify flexible and differentiated forms of regulation in so far as they do not assume uniform 
national responses (Baldwin and Cave 1999, 161).  
Evaluating decision-making of private self-regulation, we arrive at a similarly ambiguous judgement, 
albeit for different reasons. On the one hand, self-regulatory arrangements are based on voluntary 
agreements in the private sector which should generally facilitate the establishment of such regimes. 
On the other hand, the low level of discretion characterising this approach might reduce industry's 
preparedness to engage in self-regulation because the detailed prescriptions may impact unevenly on 
the relative competitiveness of industrial actors. It has been argued that these problems of decision-
making disappear as soon as self-regulatory regimes are placed in "the shadow of hierarchy" (i.e. the 
threat of hierarchical intervention in case of non-agreement), because industry generally prefers self-
regulation over top-down regulatory standards. For reasons outlined above, the EU's decision-
making capacity in the case of regulatory standards is itself rather low; hence, the effect of the 
legislative threat can hardly be taken for granted when it comes to the establishment of self-
regulatory arrangements.  
In sum, the analysis indicates that the capacity to decide regulatory norms in the EU multi-level 
system varies considerably across different modes of regulation. More specifically, decision-making 
capacity linked to the OMC clearly exceeds that of regulatory standards, while the performance of 
new instruments and private self-regulation lies somewhere in between these poles.  
3.2 Implementation Effectiveness   
Effective regulation not only dependents on legislative decisions, but also on the extent to which 
these decisions are actually implemented and complied with. Generally member states or private 
actors have to take the necessary steps in order to fulfil the objectives spelled out in European 
legislation or industrial agreements in both formal and practical terms (cf. Knill and Lenschow 
2000). To what extent do the four regulatory modes under investigation differ with respect to these 
aspects? At first glance, it seems to be rather difficult to identify significant differences. This can be 
traced to two factors.  
7
First, there are problems of equal relevance for all four approaches (cf. Baldwin and Cave 1999, 56). 
For instance, the practice of "creative compliance"; i.e., the practice of avoiding the intention of a 
law without breaking the terms of the law, constitutes a common problem for all modes of regulation 
(cf. Cohn 2002; McBarnet and Whelan 1991). Second, not all regulatory characteristics in our 
classification have clear implications for implementation performance. This holds true in particular 
for the dimension of regulatory discretion. On the one hand, there are numerous studies emphasising 
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adjust regulatory requirements to the social and political conditions at the national or subnational 
level (Lipsky 1980; Berman 1980). Other studies, by contrast, emphasise that highly specified rules 
provide a more promising basis for effective enforcement, since they define clear objectives and 
requirements for both implementers and addressees (Krämer 1992; Lübbe-Wolff 1996). Considering 
this trade-off between broad and detailed legal requirements, the level of discretion constitutes no 
useful indicator for explaining variances in the implementation performance of the different 
regulatory approaches.  
We focus therefore on those dimensions where the impact on implementation is less ambiguous, 
namely the level of obligation and the underlying steering mechanisms. Concerning the first, it is 
generally argued that highly obligatory regulation has a higher potential for effective 
implementation, as the force of law can be used to impose the fixed standards or objectives (Baldwin 
and Cave 1999, 35). In the absence of legally binding requirements, by contrast, this "push-factor" is 
lacking and compliance rests solely on the "goodwill" of the implementers. Hence, from this 
perspective the obligatory approaches (regulatory standards and new instruments) achieve a higher 
ranking than non-obligatory approaches (private self-regulation and OMC).  
However, the level of obligation is not the only factor affecting the implementation of regulatory 
approaches. Of similar importance are "pull-factors"; i.e., aspects which influence the willingness of 
implementing bodies and policy addressees to comply with European requirements. In this context, 
the underlying steering mechanisms by which regulatory objectives shall be achieved are of crucial 
importance. Thus, we follow the argument that steering mechanisms that are responsive to the 
motivations and interests of implementers and the regulated actors contribute that the regulation in 
question is implemented effectively. Analysing the different modes of regulation from this 
perspective, we find that such responsive mechanisms are particularly relevant with respect to OMC 
and, although a little less, to new instruments. In the latter case, responsiveness emerges from the 
fact that new instruments explicitly seek to change incentive structures of the involved actors in 
order to stimulate and modify the domestic policy context in favour of effective compliance. Typical 
examples are economic incentives or participation and information rights. Incentives are also the 
steering logic behind the peer review of national policy developments in the context of the OMC. 
Moreover, the OMC promotes processes of coordination and mutual learning across national policy-
makers.  
Regulatory standards do not explicitly attempt to alter strategic opportunities or stimulate mutual 
learning processes among implementers and the addressees of regulation. Their primary steering 
mechanism is coercion; behavioural adjustment is to be achieved by hierarchical means of command 
and control.  
At first sight, private self-regulation seems to rely positively on pull factors as the incentive to 
escape top-down regulations induces private regulators to formulate and comply with own rules. 
This incentive depends on the presence of a coercive threat, however. If the shadow of the hierarchy 
is perceived weak, industry may respond to the opposite incentive to cheat. Private actors might 
implement regulatory rules in a rather light-handed way as the threat of enforcement or later top-
down intervention in case of self-regulatory failure is low (Baldwin and Cave 1999, 58).  
8
Summing up this discussion on implementation performance, new instruments emerge as the most 
promising approach. They combine a high degree of obligation with an explicit orientation to alter 
domestic incentive structures in favour of effective compliance; they rely on both sticks and carrots. 
In the case of private self-regulation, by contrast, the effectiveness of the carrot depends on the stick 
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deficits. Regulatory standards and the OMC reveal mixed patterns, indicating a medium ranking. 
While the obligatory nature might positively affect the implementation of regulatory standards, their 
non-responsiveness towards the domestic context constitutes a major source of implementation 
failures. Exactly the opposite constellation can be found with respect to the OMC. Here, the 
emphasis on mutual learning and coordination might have very positive effects, while the 
voluntariness implies that there is little external push driving and guiding domestic activities.  
3.3 Problem-solving Capacity   
Even if we assume that regulatory policy is implemented effectively, this does not guarantee that it 
actually achieves its objectives; effective decision-making and implementation are not sufficient to 
ensure effective problem-solving. For once, it is a common phenomenon that - due to high scientific 
uncertainty and complexity - regulators have no full understanding of the causal mechanisms behind 
a given problem. Furthermore, regulators might well know how an effective regulatory approach 
should be designed, but lack the power and resources to carry their views through the decision-
making process. In both scenarios, the regulatory design may be inappropriate for coping with the 
problems at hand. In view of this constellation, two questions are being addressed in this section. 
First, we ask which factors might influence the quality of regulatory design. Second, we analyse the 
extent to which these factors are present or absent in the different modes of European regulation.  
With regard to the general aspects which affect the quality of regulatory design, four factors are of 
particular importance. First, high adjustment flexibility allows for swift redesign of regulations in 
light of technological innovations, new scientific evidence or experience with former approaches. 
Second, it makes a crucial difference for effective goal attainment whether regulators design their 
rules in view of the interests of the public at large or in the interests of the regulated group/industry 
(problem of capture) (Mitnick 1980). Third, the problem-solving capacity can be expected to 
increase with the extent to which the regulatory design is responsive to different national and 
subnational problem constellations. Fourth, it constitutes an essential requirement for effective 
regulation that regulators have clear indicators in order to develop sound predictions on potential 
regulatory outcomes (Baldwin and Cave 1999, 43).  
The following table shows that the different regulatory approaches under investigation reveal 
considerable differences with respect to these factors. They can be traced mainly to their distinctive 
characteristics in terms of obligation, discretion and dominant steering mechanisms.  
Table 3  
Opportunities for flexible adjustment are closely linked to the level of obligation. Adjustment is 
particularly difficult when regulation is based on legally binding directives (regulatory standards and 
new instruments). The complex procedures characterising EU policy-making and the need to 
accommodate a high diversity of interests turn the development of European legislation generally 
into a lengthy and cumbersome process. Since most changes of existing legislation require a new 
legislative decision, flexible responses in light of new regulatory, scientific or technological 
developments are difficult.(5) Flexible adjustment is much easier in cases where EU regulation is 
based on less demanding procedures. This applies in particular to the voluntary approaches of private 
self-regulation and the OMC.  
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The extent to which regulatory decisions suffer from capture problems is affected by the level of 
discretion inherent to the different approaches. Generally, capture is more likely in cases of highly 
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to carry out their task. As the regulated industry itself is the best source of such information, this 
gives industry a degree of leverage over regulatory arrangements which, in the extreme case, might 
lead to capture. From this follows that capture problems might be of particular relevance for the 
regulatory standards approach. The risk that regulatory rules primarily serve the interests of the 
industry also applies to private self-regulation where similar information asymmetries between the 
self-regulatory bodies and public enforcers exist(6). The potential for capture on the European level 
is lower if regulation is based on the definition of broad objectives and hence requires no detailed 
technical information on the side of the EU regulator. This constellation characterises new 
instruments and the OMC. However, a low potential for capture at the European level does not 
exclude selective access of certain private interests during the implementation stage. Thus, the 
danger of capture is crucially dependent on the domestic arrangement which vary from country to 
country.  
The level of discretion is also of relevance when accounting for the context responsiveness of 
different regulatory approaches. Leeway for implementers in adjusting to regulatory requirements in 
light of distinctive problem constellations at the national, regional or local levels enhances the 
chances for effective problem-solving. The realisation of this potential, however, requires steering 
mechanisms which ensure that discretion is used in line with the overall objectives of the regulation, 
hence, rely on the modification and stimulation of the policy context in favour of effective 
compliance. Both requirements (high discretion, responsive steering mechanisms) are given in the 
cases of new instruments and the OMC.  
At the same time, however, these features of new instruments and the OMC, imply certain 
disadvantages with respect to the predictability of regulatory outcomes. Thus, it is rather difficult to 
estimate, if and to what extent changes in domestic incentive structures might actually result in 
desired behavioural changes and political results (cf. Knill and Lenschow 2000). The same problem 
applies to the stimulation of mutual learning and coordination across national policy-makers. 
Considering these uncertainties and the broad leeway in terms of substantive objectives, both highly 
discretionary regulatory approaches achieve a poor ranking on predictability. The opposite holds for 
regulatory standards and private self-regulation, where clear substantive objectives provide a sounder 
basis for predicting results.(7)  
3.4 Democratic Legitimacy   
Ever since the rather unexpected opposition to the Maastricht Treaty frequent reference is made to a 
democratic deficit built into the EU polity. This lack of democracy is usually associated with weak 
parliamentary influence in and control over policy making in the multi-level system. Shortcomings 
of representative democracy have not been balanced by opportunities for public participation in the 
political process. Executive bias, secrecy, intransparency and inequality have become keywords in 
describing decision-making processes in the Council. Although the Council largely follows 
consensual practices, avoiding the outvoting of significant minorities, secrecy coupled with the 
formal option of majority voting have created a climate of distrust in the population. This is all the 
more significant as past integrative efforts have not (yet) resulted in the creation of a truly European 
public sphere feeding a transboundary political discourse and to push for the societies’ input in EU 
policy making. In other words, the very foundation of a functioning European democracy continues 
to be underdeveloped.  
The transformation of the regulatory modes we are analysing in this chapter partly reflects a 
response to this perceived lack in "input legitimacy". Non-traditional regulatory instruments aim at 
gaining public acceptance through better communication with the addressees, higher responsiveness 
to national or regional problems and the invitation of public control. We see a trend toward 
decentralising regulatory responsibilities to national and regional authorities and therefore a certain 
re-empowerment of national legislatures. 
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Before turning to the democratic performance of the different regulatory modes in more detail, we 
need to shed some light on the interplay of democratic norms and structures in the EU. Generally, we 
can distinguish between three democratic models aiming to aggregate the public will in accordance 
with full and equal representation of the people. Depending on the existence of deep cleavages in 
society (tending to a polarisation of opinions in the public) and the presence and depth of general 
solidarity in the political entity (leading to more or less acceptance of a potential minority status), we 
have seen the evolution of two types of representative democracies – majoritarian and consensual - 
which are distinct in their relative protection of functional and territorial minorities (cf. Lijphart 
1984). Furthermore, territorial scope and functional differentiation of the modern state and the rising 
demands on elected officials have contributed to the emergence of the associational format (cf. 
Cohen and Rogers 1995) where interest associations assume political functions and, due to their 
proximity to the public ear, contribute to enhance the sovereignty of the people(8).  
In the EU, we see a combination of all three models: Policy making within the majoritarian model is 
based on the support of a majority in the population. In the EU, the European Parliament 
representing the European public at large is directly elected by all citizens of the member states and 
operates on the basis of majority voting. However, the standard of equal representation has been 
altered in favour of minority protection by giving the electorate from small member states additional 
weight. The Council of Ministers derives its democratic legitimacy indirectly from national elections 
and is dominated by consensual norms. Traditionally, these have been clearly visible in the 
requirement of unanimity voting in politically salient questions and the need for rather strong 
majorities otherwise; in addition, small states are protected by the present arrangement of weighed 
votes. Increasingly, we see Council negotiations also influenced by majoritarian patterns, however, 
strengthened in all Treaty amendments since the mid-80s. Finally, associational arrangements have 
entered into EU policy making practices (Eising 2001, Schmalz-Bruns 1997).(9) At the stage of 
policy formulation particularly the Commission relies heavily on the input of various interest groups 
(Eising and Kohler-Koch 1994, Greenwood and Aspinwall 1998). More crucially, certain decision-
making responsibilities have been conferred to interest associations. For instance, private 
organisations lead the process of technical harmonisation and norm setting in the fields of social and 
environmental policy (Eichener and Voelzkow 1994), corporatist structures have been introduced in 
the regulation of industrial relations (Falkner 2000) and we see experiments with industrial self-
regulation.  
This mix of procedures and the interplay between the two representative institutions and interest 
associations fails to fully match any conventional democratic quality standard. From the perspective 
of the majoritarian model, the criterion of equality is violated and the EP does not carry enough 
weight in decision making; advocates of the consensus model will emphasize the non-existence of a 
European public glued together by a shared identity and trans-national solidarity and hence consider 
any majoritarian processes premature. Both schools are likely to be critical with respect to patterns of 
democratic control in the EU, pointing to limitations in parliamentary oversight, judicial review and 
direct scrutiny (cf. Baldwin and Cave 1999, 152-3). Associational democracy is usually perceived as 
a complementary model to the conventional structures of democratic representation, shifting some 
responsibility from the state to the people while maintaining a framework for equal representation 
and control. Considering the potential distance of EU institutions from the people, associational 
structures have been perceived as a chance to involve the public more directly in policy making, to 
close conflictual gaps in society and create a European public sphere; the ability to ensure equality 
and democratic control at the same time is viewed more critically.  
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On the basis of this brief discussion we can formulate three assumptions that will guide the following 
more detailed review of the democratic quality of the different regulatory modes in EU policy 
making:  
z A1. Due to the deep national cleavages characterising the EU polity, the absence of a self-
perceived "European demos" and in light of future enlargements, we consider the consensus 
model of democracy more adequate than the majoritarian model (cf. Kielmansegg 1996).  
z A2. The democratic legitimacy of associational decision making processes depends on 
representative structures and practices internally and its embeddedness in conventional 
structures of representative democracy (cf. Cohen and Rogers, 1995, 69-71).  
z A3. We consider the democratic legitimacy of national structures generally as superior to that 
of within the EU multi-level governance system  
Turning now to the evaluation of the four regulatory modes, we disaggregate the criterion 
"democratic legitimacy" in three sub-criteria: public mandate, due process and accountability. These 
sub-criteria capture the nature of the demos' input across all phases of policy making – from policy 
formulation to implementation and evaluation – and hence offer a full view of the democratic 
process.  
Public Mandate  
In evaluating the quality of the public mandate, we will first analyze the dominant democratic model 
underlying each regulatory type and link this analysis to the discussion above. Second, we look at the 
impact of multi-level decision-making on the democratic legitimacy.  
The four modes of regulatory policy claim legitimacy on the basis of different procedures to 
establish the public mandate: Notwithstanding the associative input indicated above, regulatory 
standards and new instruments are primarily based on a mix of majoritarian and consensual forms of 
representative authorisation. OMC relies at the decision making stage merely on the consensus 
model, with some input of stakeholder representatives. Self-regulation, in turn, is based on the 
associational model.  
Considering the societal structure of the EU, we consider the democratic mandate for OMC 
guidelines and benchmarks least problematic (cf. A1), although we need to acknowledge that the 
national representatives in the Council act at considerable distance from public discourses and, 
despite consultation arrangements with the EP and "stakeholders", are vulnerable to develop an 
executive bias. The mandate for regulatory standards and new instruments is based on mixed 
patterns. The required majority in the Council under the qualified majority rule is high and Council 
decision making remains influenced by consensual and reciprocity norms. Nevertheless, we witness 
a gradual shift towards majoritarian decision making procedures which is problematic from a 
democratic angle. The critical issue in the case of self-regulation consists in the decision to delegate 
regulatory power to private actors. A democratic mandate for such a decision needs to be derived 
from conventional practices of representative democracy (A2). In this respect the self-regulatory 
practices in the EU tend to be only indirectly legitimised as most of them are initiated by the 
European Commission and hence, the result of an administrative decision.(10) An exception is the 
Social Dialogue, which is based on a Treaty provision and framed by representative regulatory 
policy making on the EU level in the sense that the proposal of the social partners needs to be agreed 
by Council and Parliament before being adopted as an EU directive. Here associative practices 
complement and potentially strengthen EU decision making procedures by bridging distant EU 
institutions and society (cf. Falkner et al. 2002).  
Considering the multi-level structure of EU regulatory policy making, those forms of regulatory 
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mandate. Hence, the two subsidiarity models have a structural advantage vis-à-vis regulatory 
standards and self-regulation. (cf. A3). OMC relies on national governments or legislatures to 
formulate and decide all concrete policy measures aiming to achieve the benchmarks set on the EU 
level. In contrast, new instruments seek national democratic mandates merely for the specification 
and sometimes elaboration of EU law. Nevertheless, especially framework legislation leaves real 
scope for national decision making and exploits the democratic potential of subsidiarity.(11)  
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To sum up, the consensual style of decision making on the EU level combined with the most 
discretionary practice places OMC at "first place", followed by discretionary new instruments. 
Notably, OMC acknowledges the absence of a European demos while at the same time aiming at 
building a European public sphere, although at the expense of European parliamentary input. Self-
regulatory practices, bypassing any representative organ on the EU-level, rank even below the 
regulatory standards relying on these organs. However, there may be variants that are backed legally 
(Treaty mandates) and embedded in EU law. These pass as a legitimate form of associative 
democracy while at the same time closing the gap between the EU and society.  
Due Process  
Due process relates to the decision making and the implementation phase of public policy making 
and claims public support on the basis of equal and wide participatory rights granted to as well as 
substantive equality provided for those affected by regulatory decisions. Both dimensions are 
especially challenging in the trans-national and multi-level system of the EU.  
The issue of participatory rights is distinct from the public mandate in that it refers to the scope of 
participation in the formulation of regulatory policy by those affected or involved in the 
implementation. Here, we are confronted with two opposing general images of conventional 
regulatory policy making in the EU: While some emphasise the extraordinary openness of the 
Commission, inviting input from all parts of society, others perceive the Commission as a gatekeeper 
and deplore the level of executive and bureaucratic discretion leading to potential biases in the public 
input and even to forms of clientelism. Intransparency is a main criticism put forward against the rise 
of committee-driven policy formulation (as well as decision making and implementation). While 
equal access of all interests affected remains an empirical question, intransparency generally hinders 
effective insurance of due process inside comitology.(12)  
The delegation of regulatory responsibilities to private actors or to the member state level, adds new 
dimensions to due process. Again, we will assume that all democratic standards are met on the 
national level. But furthermore, we can observe that the EU puts a lot of effort in designing and 
prescribing due process procedures for implementation and subsequent regulation in the member 
states. New instruments such as procedural rights to information or public hearings aim to enhance 
public involvement on the ground. OMC resembles new instruments in encouraging "enlightened" 
policy making on the EU and national level through incentive structures and participatory practices.  
In contrast to all forms of public regulation, it is the very point of self-regulation to closely involve 
those affected by the regulation; but in practice, this has come at the risk of turning "due process" on 
its head. Only to the extent that all those affected by the regulation (or non-regulation) in the relevant 
problem area are represented in the self-regulatory process, such "private governance" meets due 
process standards. The proverbial characteristic of self-regulation is its industrial bias, however, 
constraining the input of the general public, the consumers, the residents etc. This bias is related to 
the desire to form a coherent group, sharing similar problems and pressures, in order to arrive at a 
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watchdog and self-regulatory systems can be structured inclusively from the start (recall A3).  
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With respect to the second dimension of due process, substantive equality, the much praised 
regulatory discretion may turn out to be a problem. Discretion opens room for unequal substantive 
treatment of the regulated, inconsistencies within or between policies and distortions of the market 
due to different local regulatory patterns. On the basis of substantive equal treatment therefore, EU 
public or private standard setting appears superior to the two subsidiarity models, although the 
capacity of the EU regulators to ensure that self-regulatory networks guarantee the application of the 
private norms is also limited. The insistence on substantive equality is not uncontroversial, however, 
as it may go hand in hand with a great insensitivity to the circumstances experienced by those 
affected by regulatory decisions. Uniform regulation does not take account of different 
administrative structures, established technologies or problem saliencies. Hence we need to 
distinguish between regulatory content that requires uniform application in the EU due to the 
presence of trans-boundary effects or market distortions and regulatory content that can be achieved 
flexibly. The combination of regulatory uniformity and discretion is the main philosophy of new 
instruments. The recognition of national diversity also explains the high discretionary practice of 
OMC. However, while OMC aims to facilitate learning and public involvement, hoping for national 
improvements and in the longer run more consistent regulatory structures in the EU in areas where 
EU-regulation is absent, it does not establish any firm regulatory framework guaranteeing activity on 
the national or regional level.  
To sum up the discussion on due process, on two dimensions we saw ambiguous effects. While 
regulatory discretion is likely to impact positively on the level of access and participation of those 
affected by the decisions (especially the implementing actors), discretion does not contribute to 
substantive equality. The relative importance of this latter criterion varies with the regulatory intent, 
however. With respect to the dominant steering mechanisms we see two patterns of making use of 
associative structures. The coercive model contributes to substantive equality, while treating the 
openness of procedures and involvement of stakeholders as secondary; the learning model 
emphasises openness of the process more than equal outcomes. From this ambiguous picture new 
instruments stand out as performing quite well on all counts.  
Accountability  
Regulators may claim democratic legitimacy even in cases where the public has not been involved in 
the rule making process if the people have the possibility to exercise public control over the 
responsible regulatory authority. Once again, we need to take into consideration the multi-level 
structure of the European Union. Focusing on Brussels, Baldwin and Cave (1999, 152-3) arrive at 
generally sceptical conclusions, pointing to a gap between the powers conferred to the Community 
and the controls of the elected Parliament, the weak control most national parliaments have over 
their governments acting on the European arena – a situation made worse by the fact that the citizens 
of a member state may be regulated by a provision that their representing minister has been outvoted 
on. Also, they observe that the ECJ's resources are limited; review tends to be sporadic and depends 
on there being a party with the knowledge and financing to bring on action. Furthermore, the ECJ 
looks to the legality, not merits or substance, of regulatory rules or actions. This perspective applies 
to the classical form of regulatory intervention, namely EU regulatory standards.  
Both parliamentary and direct public control are enhanced by the decentralisation of regulatory tasks 
to regional or national public authorities (cf. A3), hence the use of discretionary new instruments. 
The fact that in practice this may come at the expense of some confusion over the relevant locus of 
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system. In the case of OMC this benefit of subsidiarity is taken even further as national 
parliamentary and electoral control mechanisms apply to the bulk of the regulatory activity. 
Furthermore, OMC attempts to compensate for intransparent structures on the EU-level with soft 
methods of accountability like peer review and reporting requirements, combined with a high level 
of publicity, aiming to ensure that member state governments meet the common benchmarks. The 
process of benchmarking on the EU-level, establishing the framework for national policy making, 
requires closer analysis. On the one hand, this process seems to escape the – even though deficient – 
traditional forms of control in Brussels, making bad things worse. The European Parliament is 
largely excluded from the process; judicial review is secondary due to the weak legal context.(13) 
On the other hand, the consensual structure (cf. A1) and participation of stakeholders links the 
benchmarking process to national parliaments and the associative representatives of the general 
public, creating alternative ways towards public control.  
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Finally, self-regulation is clearly most problematic in terms of public control. Besides the remote 
sanctioning powers of public authorities, self-regulatory systems risk being captured by groups who 
are not representative of the general public – or even those affected by the regulation – and closed to 
public oversight. This does not mean that self-regulatory systems principally cannot be held 
accountable. To the extent that they are constrained by statutory prescriptions, ministerial or 
parliamentary guidelines, reporting and publication requirements, etc. self-regulators become subject 
to public control and scrutiny (cf. A2). The implicit threat of legislative intervention in case of self-
regulatory failure may have a similar effect.  
The following table summarises the preceding discussion. While a summarising score is impossible 
given the complexity of the issue, we observe generally good performance in the two subsidiarity 
models, due to their reliance on national democratic structures and a partial opening of decision 
making procedures to the wider public, paving the ground for an emerging European public sphere.  
Table 4 
4 Conclusion   
Although methodological problems make it impossible to establish an overall ranking of the 
different modes of European regulation in terms of their governance performance, the comparatively 
good evaluation of new instruments and OMC is somewhat surprising. The question that 
immediately emerges is "Why are regulatory standards the still dominating mode of intervention in 
EU policy making?" In this context several factors have to be emphasised.  
First, the dominance of the classical approach might partly be the result of institutional inertia 
preventing most organisations to engage in quick and radical reforms and the structural limits of the 
EU regulatory state in tying the levels of governance into an effective whole.  
Second, it should not be overlooked that the choice of evaluation criteria is somewhat selective. 
Although we have focused on the most common factors, we can hardly claim that our selection is 
encompassing all aspects which might be of relevance. Thus, it might well be the case that in 
selecting different criteria, one might arrive at different evaluation results. This holds true, in 
particular, for OMC, which has number of limitations potentially reducing its regulatory utility: (a) 
Both, its regulatory claim (to merely establish guidelines and benchmarks) and the consensual 
decision making process may result in an undemanding framework for national policy making. 
Hence, there may be a trade-off between democratic decision making and reliable steering capacity. 
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be expected immediately. (c) OMC relies on an experimental process of problem solving, hence is 
not designed to ensure certain results. (d) OMC accepts the unequal treatment of regulatory 
addressees in the member states; i.e. is not interested in creating a level playing field.  
Third, the choice of regulatory approaches is rarely the result of a necessarily selective normative 
evaluation on the part of the policy makers, but it reflects underlying interest constellations and 
strategic interactions shaping the decision-making processes at the European and national level. 
From this perspective, both new instruments and OMC constitute rather unsuitable approaches if the 
creation of a level playing field and hence, harmonisation is one of the aims of the regulators. Such 
aim would be best served through hierarchical regulatory standards. The same holds true if the 
decision makers share a preference for predictable and reliable regulatory arrangements. The 
regulatory framework of OMC and new instruments is likely to be too flexible, whereas hierarchical 
norms give clearly defined directions. As the dominance of classical approaches suggests, these 
considerations have obviously been of crucial importance in EU governance.  
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However, this does not imply an inevitable dominance of the regulatory standards approach. Both 
new instruments and OMC could be preferable options if the maintenance of national diversity is 
desirable or unchangeable. The same holds for constellations in which risk and insecurity are 
characterising the regulatory context with the effect that no clear and generally applicable regulatory 
solution is in supply.  
In sum, we come to the general conclusion that any final evaluation of a regulatory format depends 
on the weighing of the individual criteria, which in turn needs to be based on the character of the 
policy problem to be solved. While regional diversity, and hence a discretionary policy design may 
be perfectly acceptable in some areas, the economic context (competition, mobility, etc.), the 
presence of external and in particular transnational effects, the expressed pursuit of shared values or 
the commonly perceived problem salience may call for uniform standards or procedures in all 
member states. It was the intent of this paper to develop a template that will facilitate any such 
contextualised evaluation. We have provided criteria and an overview of structural advantages and 
disadvantages; the weighing of the criteria needs to be done on a case by case basis. Finally, it 
should be noted that our analysis can be used not only to decide between regulatory modes, but also 
to engage in regulatory reforms within a certain mode.  
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Endnotes  
(*) This article will be published in a slightly revised form in Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur 
(eds.), The Politics of Regulation: Examining Regulatory Institutions and Instruments in the Age of 
Governance. London: Edward Elgar, 2003. We would like to thank two anonymous referees for very 
instructive and helpful comments.  
(1) Compare Moran (2002) for an excellent review as well as Scott (2003). 
(2) The distinctive form of EU legislation (e.g. the directly applicable Regulations or Directives 
requiring national transposition) has no systematic impact on the discretion level. Empirical research 
indicates that Directives are often formulated in a highly detailed manner, hence leaving little room 
for adjustments in national transposition laws. In addition, the Court emphasised that Directives, 
even without national transposition, unfold direct legal effects at the national level. On the other 
hand, there are Regulations which are formulated broadly, leaving the member states considerable 
leeway for interpreting the directly binding requirements.  
(3) Also self-regulation and OMC are new forms of governance but distinct from the so-called new 
instruments in their more radical departure from traditional law-based patterns of intervention. 
(4) To be sure, judging the extent to which a certain mode of regulation is legitimate in terms of 
input and output criteria is not to offer an assessment of the actual support that a regulator enjoys. It 
is rather an assessment of the legitimacy that a regulator deserves. What matters is the collective 
justificatory power of the arguments that can be made with respect to the four criteria in question (cf. 
Baldwin and Cave 1999, 82). 
(5) In some contexts, the comitology procedure provides for an alternative to lengthy legislative 
negotiations and allows for faster adjustment to typically technological or scientific developments. 
(6) The problem of capture will generally be much more pronounced in cases where public interests 
(such as environmental or consumer organisation) are excluded from the decision-making process. 
(7) Of course, even the predictability of outcomes of clear regulatory standards is limited in many 
problem areas that are characterised by high levels of scientific uncertainty and hence, risk.  
(8) This, of course, depends on the internal organisational characteristics of interest associations as 
well as the level to which associative constellations succeed in representing the plurality of public 
opinion. 
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12.02.2003 http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2003-001.htm(9) Furthermore, the mode of direct democracy exists in the EU – however, only with regard to 
constitutional questions and not in the process of regulatory policy making. Hence, we can ignore 
this democratic form in our discussion. 
(10) The Commission receives its mandate from democratically legitimated institutions – Council 
and Parliament – who delegate certain tasks to it, and from the provisions of the EU Treaty. 
(11) In the regulatory practice of the EU, framework legislation tends to be coupled with the drafting 
of more detailed daughter directives, however, leaving the regulatory responsibility with policy 
makers in Brussels. 
(12) It must be noted that committees do not exist outside legal oversight (cf. Comitology Decision 
87/373/EEC) and therefore, may also contribute to the rationalisation of regulatory processes and the 
creation of mutually agreeable and cooperative solutions (cf. Joerges 2002). 
(13) Some, though not all, forms of national policy coordination have been introduced directly to the 
Treaties, however in very generic terms. Besides, OMC benchmarks or guidelines are not legally 
binding (Working Group 2001) 
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Modes of Regulation in the EU 
Table II 
Steering Mechanisms and Types of Regulation 
Legend: ++ dominant mechanism; + relevant mechanism; 0 irrelevant mechanism 
High level of obligation Low level of obligation
High level of 
discretion 
New Instruments  
economic, communicative, framework 
regulation 
OMC 
Open method of 
coordination 
Low level of 
discretion 
Regulatory Standards 
substantive, procedural 
Self-regulation 
in the shadow of the state 
 
 
 
 
 
Regulatory 
Standards New Instruments Self-regulation OMC
Coercion
++  
legally binding 
standards 
+  
framework and 
procedural rules 
+  
shadow of hierarchy 
+ 
reporting and 
monitoring 
Incentive 
structures 0
++  
changes of procedural 
and/or material 
opportunities 
++  
private actors influence 
regulatory standards 
+  
peer pressure 
Learning 0 0
+ 
communication in 
private networks 
++ 
best practice 
models 
Hierarchy 
model: 
power of 
coercion
Public delegation 
model:  
traditional 
subsidiarity
Private delegation 
model
Radical 
subsidiarity 
model: 
public learning 
approach
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Regulatory Modes and Problem-solving Capacity 
Table IV 
Democratic legitimacy of four regulatory modes 
©2003 by Knill & Lenschow 
formated and tagged by S.H., 11.2.2003
Regulatory 
Standards New Instruments Self-
regulation OMC
Adjustment 
flexibility Low Low High High
Danger of capture High Low, but depending on 
national transposition High Low, but depending on 
national transposition
Context 
responsiveness Low High Low High
Predictability of 
outcomes High Low High Low
Regulatory 
Standards New Instruments Self-regulation OMC
Democratic 
Mandate
EU level:  
deficient 
EU-level: 
deficient 
EU-level: 
mostly poor 
EU-level :  
acceptable 
National level:  
good 
SR-level:  
typically biased 
National level:  
good 
Due Process
Participation  
at the discretion 
of the EU 
executive 
Participation  
on EU-level as RS; 
emphasised on 
national level 
Participation  
great reliance on 
"those affected", 
but danger of bias 
Participation  
stakeholder 
participation on both 
levels of governance 
Substantive 
equality 
yes – 
disregarding 
local 
circumstances 
Substantive 
Equality  
partial – combined 
with 
responsiveness to 
local conditions 
Substantive 
Equality  
yes – assuming 
authority of self-
regulatory network 
vis-à-vis its 
members 
Substantive Equality 
weak – indirect 
encouragement of 
local adjustments 
Accountability
Control  
deficient on EU 
level 
Control  
deficiency on EU-
level is partly 
corrected on 
national level 
Control  
weak in practice, 
but possible in 
theory 
Control  
ambiguous on EU 
level; traditional + soft 
mechanisms applied 
to national activity 
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